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Benjamin Franklin once said, “[t]hose, who would give up 
essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither 
liberty nor safety.”1  Justice Brandeis echoed this sentiment when he 
delivered his famous admonition: 
[I]t is . . . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforce-
ment. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to 
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. 
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk 
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but 
without understanding.2
So important was the protection from government intrusion on the 
personal essential liberties of expression and religion that the framers 
of the United States Constitution listed them first in the Bill of 
Rights: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”3  Similarly, in the United Kingdom, these es-
sential liberties are protected under the Human Rights Act, which 
was instituted in accordance with the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights.4
 ∗ J.D. candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2007; M.A., Georgian 
Court University, 2004; B.S., Saint Peter’s College, 2000. 
 1 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM ITS ORIGIN (1759), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, at 107 (Jared Sparks ed., Townsend MacCoun 1882). 
 2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 
acts/acts1998/19980042.htm. 
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Prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon on September 11, 2001, the United Kingdom already had some 
of the toughest anti-terrorism laws in the world, such as the Terror-
ism Act 2000,5 having dealt with internal terrorist conflicts for years 
due to the dispute over Northern Ireland.  After September 11, 2001, 
both the United States and the United Kingdom passed more strin-
gent anti-terror legislation.  In the United States, the USA PATRIOT 
Act (“PATRIOT Act”) was enacted, making it easier for law enforce-
ment officials to conduct surveillance of suspected terrorists.6  In the 
United Kingdom, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 20057 and the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act8 were enacted by British Par-
liament, making it easier for British law enforcement to conduct sur-
veillance on suspected terrorists and to detain them without charge 
for an extended period of time.9
While these laws were enacted to protect the general public 
from harm by terrorists,10 the implications of the PATRIOT Act in the 
United States and the Anti-Terror Laws in the United Kingdom are 
far-reaching with respect to the personal liberty of every person in 
those nations.11  In particular, because of their religious beliefs, 
 5 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts2000/20000011.htm. 
 6 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 
42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).  
 7 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/50002--a.htm. 
 8 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf. 
 9 See Prevention of Terrorism Act; Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act. 
 10 See PATRIOT Act (stating the purpose of the Act as “to deter and punish ter-
rorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement 
investigatory tools, and for other purposes”); see also, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (stating the purpose of the Act as “to provide for the making against individuals 
involved in terrorism-related activity of orders imposing obligations on them for 
purposes connected with preventing or restricting their further involvement in such 
activity; to make provision about appeals and other proceedings relating to such or-
ders; and for connected purposes”); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (stating 
the purpose of the Act as “to strengthen legislation in a number of areas to ensure 
that the Government, in the light of the new situation arising from the September 11 
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, have the necessary powers to counter 
the increased threat to the UK”); Terrorism Act, 2000, Explanatory Notes, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2000/2000en11.htm (stating the purpose of the Act 
as to reform and expand “previous counter-terrorist legislation . . . largely on a per-
manent basis”). 
 11 See, e.g., Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the 
USA PATRIOT Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505 (2002) (discussing 
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members of the Muslim community have suffered, and will continue 
to suffer, adverse effects on their civil liberties due to these laws.12  
Specifically, Muslims have suffered and continue to be exposed to 
civil and criminal penalties in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom for merely expressing themselves in accordance with their 
religious beliefs.13  In an even more recent troubling evolution of 
U.K. law, the newly passed Terrorism Act 200614 potentially contra-
venes freedoms protected under the Human Rights Act 1998, leaving 
those who merely express a political opinion open to deportation 
from the United Kingdom.15  In short, the PATRIOT Act and the 
Anti-Terror Laws may have gone too far, stepping away from the es-
sential liberties guaranteed by the supreme laws of the respective na-
the bars to asylum and withholding for non-citizens in the United States after the 
implementation of the PATRIOT Act); Edgar and Witold Walczak, Perspectives on the 
USA PATRIOT Act: We Can Be Both Safe and Free: How the PATRIOT Act Threatens Civil 
Liberties, 76 PA BAR ASSN. QTRLY. 21, 21 (2005) (discussing the threats to civil liberties 
based upon relaxed requirements for government surveillance and wiretapping war-
rants); Liberty, Press Release, Government Publishes Terrorism Bill (Oct. 12, 2005), 
available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news-and-events/1-press-
releases/2005/terrorism-bill-date-of-publication.shtml [hereinafter Liberty, Press Re-
lease]. 
 12 See generally D.C., Md., and Va. Advisory Comms. to the U.S. Comm’n on Civil 
Rights, Civil Rights Concerns in the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Area: In the Aftermath of 
the September 11, 2001, Tragedies (2003), reprinted in 8 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 107 
(2003) [hereinafter Civil Rights Concerns] (discussing the impact of the September 11, 
2001 tragedies, as well as the implementation of the PATRIOT Act, on the civil liber-
ties of Muslims and Sikhs, as well as persons of South Asian and Arabic descent living 
in the United States). 
 13 See Civil Rights Concerns, supra note 12, at 146–60 (describing the raids of homes 
of Muslims not accused of terrorist acts, as well as the seizure of “property ranging 
from computers to children’s toys”; describing the arrests of Muslims for visa viola-
tions which were relatively minor in nature and would probably not have been prose-
cuted before September 11, 2001; and describing the detention and deportation of 
immigrants of the Muslim faith and of Arabic descent without benefit of counsel); 
Liberty, Press Release, supra note 11 (describing the potential problems of the pro-
posed laws, including the lack of any intent requirement in criminal prosecutions, as 
well as the change in potential detention period of suspects, without charge, from 
two weeks to three months).  For a further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 
99–230 and accompanying text. 
 14 The Terrorism Act 2006 received Royal Assent on March 30, 2006.  Press Re-
lease, Home Office, Terrorism, ID Cards and Immigration Bills Become Law (Mar. 
30, 2006), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/new-acts [here-
inafter Clarke Press Release]. 
 15 STATEWATCH, PROTECT OUR RIGHTS: A BRIEFING DOCUMENT ON THE 
GOVERNMENTS [SIC] ANTI-TERRORISM PROPOSALS 7 (2005), 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/protectourrightsbriefing.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PROTECT OUR RIGHTS]. 
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tions and toward a sort of safety which the framers of human rights 
laws in both nations may never have intended.16
This Comment will explore the effect the PATRIOT Act and the 
Anti-Terror laws have on freedom of expression and free exercise of 
religion in both the United States and the United Kingdom.  Section 
I.A gives a description of the laws in both countries, as well as their 
effects to date on Muslim persons within their borders.17  Section I.B 
gives a brief history of Islam and the possible interpretations of the 
faith that cause particular problems for fundamentalist Muslims.18  
Section II.A discusses hypothetical situations in which Muslims could 
unexpectedly find themselves should they express their firmly-held 
and genuine religious beliefs.19  Section II.B gives a constitutional and 
statutory assessment of the PATRIOT Act.20  Section II.C discusses the 
U.K.’s Anti-Terror legislation in light of the Human Rights Act 1998 
and the European Convention on Human Rights.21  Section II.D dis-
cusses the potential penalties and defenses to charges brought under 
either the PATRIOT Act or the U.K.’s Anti-Terror Laws.22  Finally, 
Section III concludes the Comment with a synopsis of the issues dis-
cussed therein.23
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. History of the Laws Against Terrorism 
The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for the full name of the 
law, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.”24  
The PATRIOT Act was enacted by Congress on October 26, 2001, just 
weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.25  
The PATRIOT Act was eventually codified as several different laws 
 16 See generally Civil Rights Concerns, supra note 12, at 146–60; PROTECT OUR 
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 7. 
 17 See infra notes 24–73 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 74–101 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 108–156 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 157–182 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 183–230 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text. 
 24 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 
42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 25 Id. 
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under the United States Code, as it both modified prior United States 
Code sections and created several new sections as well.26
The stated purpose of the PATRIOT Act seems genuine as it 
seeks “[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and 
around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, 
and for other purposes.”27  As such, the PATRIOT Act amends many 
laws already in place and strengthens the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to “combat terrorism” in general.28  This includes the ability 
of the federal government to use formerly illegal methods of surveil-
lance to gather critical information about suspected terrorists.29  It 
also includes cross-departmental and cross-agency cooperation and 
sharing of information to follow up on leads regarding suspected ter-
rorist activities.30  No longer does the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978 (FISA)31 cause the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to remain under the limitations and strictures imposed by the 
former Attorney General, Janet Reno, when sharing information with 
the Department of Justice.32  Prior to the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act, the FBI and the Department of Justice were precluded from 
sharing information regarding criminal activity obtained by way of a 
FISA wiretap when the primary purpose of the tap was surveillance of 
foreign intelligence, unless certain conditions were met.33  Since the 
inception of the PATRIOT Act, the agencies may more freely share 
information when pursuing a “significant purpose” of foreign intelli-
gence gathering, regardless of the primary purpose of the surveil-
lance.34  Such information sharing would allow the Department of 
Homeland Security to follow up on leads without the previous “red 
tape” involved.35  These new methods of surveillance include moni-
toring of bank records and charities, wire tapping, and access to per-
 26 Id. 
 27 Id., preamble. 
 28 See id. (modifying scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 29 Id. tit. II.  
 30 USA PATRIOT Act tit. II. 
 31 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 
(Supp. 2006)). 
 32 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act;  see also Craig S. Lerner, The USA PATRIOT Act: 
Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 493, 495–506 (2003) (discussing the prior problems of information 
sharing between the Department of Justice and the FBI where matters of purely in-
ternal criminal activity were the focus of an investigation). 
 33 Lerner, supra note 32, at 500–01. 
 34 USA PATRIOT Act § 218. 
 35 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act tit. II; see also Lerner, supra note 32, at 495–506. 
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sonal e-mail of suspected terrorists, to name a few.36  The federal gov-
ernment also maintains a watch list of charities linked with material 
support of terrorist activity,37 which was provided for under the 
PATRIOT Act and is monitored by the Secretary of the Treasury in 
concert with the Attorney General and the Department of Homeland 
Security.38
In the United Kingdom, many so-called “Anti-Terror Laws” ex-
isted prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq conflict.39  
Many of these were in place specifically because of the attacks on 
Great Britain and its territories by movements for the liberation of 
Northern Ireland.40  However, the United Kingdom also believed that 
the threat of international terrorism was on the rise, so it put in place 
the Terrorism Act 2000 (“TACT”) in order to account for interna-
tional terrorist groups.41
TACT was passed by British Parliament on July 20, 2000.42  The 
law came into force on February 19, 2001, as a response to the con-
tinuing threat of international terrorism, and it replaced much of the 
previous, temporary anti-terror legislation in the U.K., which dealt 
primarily with problems in Northern Ireland.43  Similar in scope to 
the PATRIOT Act, though passed and entered into force long before 
the PATRIOT Act, TACT allows for law enforcement to monitor and 
investigate suspected terrorists more easily than before TACT entered 
into force.44  In addition to outlawing fourteen Irish groups, TACT 
also outlaws twenty-five international groups,45 many of which are on 
the Terrorist Exclusion List in the United States as well.46
In addition, TACT criminalizes several offenses not previously 
contemplated by the Crown, including: 1) inciting terrorist acts;47 2) 
seeking or providing training for terrorist purposes at home or over-
 36 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act tit. II, III, & X; see also Lerner, supra note 31, at 
495–506. 
 37 OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
TERRORIST EXCLUSION LIST (2003), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/ 
15222.htm [hereinafter TERRORIST EXCLUSION LIST]. 
 38 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act tit. III; see also Lerner, supra note 31, at 495–506. 
 39 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.).  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). 
 46 TERRORIST EXCLUSION LIST, supra note 37. 
 47 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, Pt. VI (Eng.).   
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seas;48 and 3) providing instruction or training in the use of firearms, 
explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.49  These provi-
sions are similar in scope to the criminalization of such activities in 
the United States under the PATRIOT Act.50
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United Kingdom 
passed two new terrorism laws.  The first of these, the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001 (“ATCSA”), was passed in November 
2001 by British Parliament, in direct response to the September 11, 
2001 attacks.51  Its purpose and scope were similar to those listed in 
the PATRIOT Act in the United States.52  In addition to amending 
the Terrorist Act 2000, the ATCSA seeks to keep funds out of the 
hands of terrorists by: 1) monitoring banks and charities more 
closely;53 2) allowing for easier collection and sharing of information 
regarding terrorist threats between government departments and 
agencies;54 3) streamlining the immigration procedures that might be 
relevant to terrorist threats to the U.K.;55 4) stopping people who seek 
to promote any kind of religious and racial hatred and/or violence;56 
5) ensuring the secure operation of nuclear and aviation industry in 
the U.K.;57 6) improving the security surrounding dangerous chemi-
cals and substances that may be targeted for destruction or used by 
terrorists in attacks;58 7) extending the police powers of relevant law 
enforcement and military agencies;59 8) ensuring that Great Britain 
can meet its obligations to the rest of Europe in reference to coop-
eration between the police and judiciary, and its international obliga-
tions to end bribery and corruption;60 and 9) revamping portions of 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001(USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, § 805, 115 Stat. 272, 377–78 (amending the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
2339A to broaden the scope of the definition of training to include expert advice); 
id. § 817, 115 Stat. 385–86 (expanding the scope of the Biological Weapons Statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 175, to include as a punishable offense the possession of a biological 
agent or delivery system of such agent). 
 51 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, Explanatory Notes (Eng.).  
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, Explanatory Notes. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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the U.K.’s anti-terrorist laws.61  ATCSA goes even further than the 
PATRIOT Act in some respects, as it contains a large section that at-
tempts to regulate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass 
destruction,62 whereas this is only a peripheral function of the 
PATRIOT Act.63
The second major anti-terror law passed in the United Kingdom 
was The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (“PTA”).64  The PTA, 
passed on March 11, 2005, replaced Part 4 of ATCSA,65 largely be-
cause Part 4 was considered to be racist and nationalist in nature, as it 
originally affected only foreign nationals and did not have the power 
to affect U.K. citizens.66  The reason the PTA was introduced by the 
U.K. government was to reduce the risk of terrorism by providing for 
“control orders” so that residents of Great Britain could go forward 
with their business freely and with confidence.67  According to the 
U.K. government, the PTA further seeks to balance individual liberty 
and collective security by allowing the Home Secretary to place a per-
son suspected of terrorism under a control order.68  These control 
orders grant permission for British law enforcement to monitor the 
suspect, take away the suspect’s freedom to leave the country or move 
around the U.K., and force the suspect to submit to searches of his or 
her home.69
The Terrorism Act 2006, though drafted prior to the July 7, 2005 
bombings of the London public transportation system, was brought 
to bear on Parliament in August 2005.70  At the time named the Ter-
rorism Bill, the Terrorism Act 2006 will lead to more stringent regula-
tions as to associating or speaking with others who “glorify terror-
ism.”71  However, the Terrorism Act 2006 goes much further than 
other legislation of its kind in the U.K.  Under this new law, acts such 
as looking at certain websites or reading certain books may result in 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001(USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 817, 115 Stat. 272, 385–86. 
 64 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.). 
 65 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, supra note 8, Part IV.   
 66 AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT 2005: UNITED KINGDOM (2005), 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/gbr-summary-eng. 
 67 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Explanatory Notes. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.   
 70 PROTECT OUR RIGHTS, supra note 15. 
 71 Id. 
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deportation for foreign nationals in the U.K..72  Under a corollary law 
to the Terrorism Act 2006 called the Identity Cards Act, U.K. citizens 
will have to carry ID cards with vital biometric information, such as 
fingerprints, and present them at spot checks and border crossings.73
B. A Brief History of Islam and the Problems Created For It By the 
PATRIOT Act and the U.K. Anti-Terror Laws. 
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, many of the 
organizations which make up terrorist watch lists are Muslim charities 
and religious groups.74  As such, it is important to understand the 
background of Islam and its followers in order to understand the 
problems created for them by the laws of general applicability in both 
countries. 
Islam was founded approximately 1,400 years ago by the prophet 
Muhammad in what is modern-day Saudi Arabia.  According to the 
majority view, there are Five Pillars of the religion: 
1. submitting oneself by stating that there is no God but God (Allah) 
and that Muhammad is His Prophet;75 
2. observing the faith through prayer five times per day;76 
3. giving alms to the poor (also known as “Zakat”);77 
4. making the pilgrimage to Mecca (also known as  the “Hajj”);78 and 
5. observing the required fasting during the month of Ramadan.79 
Preaching, referred to as da’wah,80 and proselytizing, often referred to 
as tabligh,81 are also regarded as fundamental principles of the faith.82
A minority view among Muslims is that there is a sixth pillar of 
the faith: Jihad,83 often translated as the “the duty to ‘struggle’ or 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.; see also Clarke Press Release, supra note 14. 
 74 TERRORIST EXCLUSION LIST, supra note 37; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act, 2001, c. 24, Explanatory Notes (Eng.). 
 75 Donna E. Arzt, The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and 
Ridda, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 19 (2002). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 20.   
 81 Arzt, supra note 75, at 20. 
 82 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?, Hearing Before the S. Judi-
ciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Steve Emerson, Executive Director, 
Investigative Project on Terrorism), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1669&wit_id=4791.
 83 See Arzt, supra note 75, at 19–21 (citations omitted).  
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‘sacrifice’ in the path of God.”84  This minority view has often been 
rejected by scholars in the faith.85  However, many Muslims do believe 
that Jihad is an element of the faith, even if it is not a pillar of the 
faith.86  Often, this element is interpreted broadly as meaning a per-
sonal struggle.87  Among the minority, however, it can mean a variety 
of things, from preaching and teaching the faith to acts of violence in 
an attempt to end oppression of Muslims in certain areas of the 
world.88
Even among the majority belief system, some elements of the 
Five Pillars may lead to a belief in the validity of Jihad.89  In particular, 
Surah 9, Section 8, Verse 60 of the Qur’an, which sets forth the 
classes of people who are eligible for Zakah, or almsgiving, states that 
the following people may receive aid: 
1. the needy; 
2. the poor; 
3. those who work to administer funds to the poor; 
4. those who are recently converted and may be disdained for their be-
liefs, and thus must receive funds until they can establish a new live-
lihood for themselves;  
5. those who are in bondage, physical or otherwise (including slaves 
and prisoners of war); 
6. those who are in debt;  
7. those who struggle in the cause of God and are thus unable to earn a liv-
ing otherwise; and  
8. those who are stranded (wayfarers).90 
In the United States, the most prevalent problem for Muslims is 
the restriction on religious conduct, namely, giving freely to charity 
in accordance with Surah 9:60.91  In the United Kingdom, the most 
prevalent problem for Muslims is the restriction on preaching and 
other forms of religious free speech.92  Both restrictions cause a sub-
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN 456 (10th ed. 1996). 
 90 Id.  (emphasis added). 
 91 See id.  In the United States, because of the protections on free speech where 
such speech does not directly incite violence, the main restriction appears to be on 
religious conduct.  This restriction comes in the form of generalized laws which ban 
any party, regardless of religion, from donating to specific charitable organizations.  
See infra notes 108–156 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 172–180 and accompanying text. 
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stantial burden upon Muslims, as both limit their ability to practice 
their religion freely.  However, the restriction on speech in the 
United Kingdom is the more substantial of the two because it is a 
more complete restriction than that on giving to charities in either 
nation. 
In two of the world’s leading democratic societies, anti-terror 
legislation provides for harsh restrictions on free speech, free associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion.93  While the legal systems in each 
nation differ based upon the existence, or lack thereof, of a written 
constitution, these societies have nonetheless made certain guaran-
tees to their people that their rights to speak, associate, and practice 
in accordance with their firmly held religious beliefs shall not be in-
fringed except where the governments of those nations have a com-
pelling reason in so doing.94  Islam, while practiced the world over by 
over one billion people,95 is a minority faith in both of these na-
tions.96  The impact of anti-terrorism legislation in both nations could 
be significant if the laws are not narrowly tailored and interpreted by 
the judiciary in a way that respects the fundamental freedoms of ex-
pression and speech, association, and religion.  The government’s in-
terest in preventing terrorism is certainly compelling.  However, the 
compelling interest of the government may not be as narrowly tai-
lored as it should be, in that some claim that the ability of a minority 
of religious people to conduct themselves in accordance with their 
beliefs has been chilled.97  Such a practice may, in fact, work to chill 
the practice of the minority religion.  In addition, there may be a less 
restrictive means of preventing acts of terrorism in these democratic 
societies.98
The governments of both the United States and the United 
Kingdom may restrict speech and religious conduct in a less restric-
tive way than those found within the PATRIOT Act and the proposed 
 93 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 
22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.); Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of Ter-
rorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 
(Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). 
 94 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1; Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
 95 BRITISH BROAD. CO., RELIGION & ETHICS—ISLAM AT A GLANCE, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/ataglance/glance.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2007). 
 96 See TOLERANCE.ORG, WHAT IS ISLAM? (2001), http://www.tolerance.org/news/ 
article_tol.jsp?id=273. 
 97 See Civil Rights Concerns, supra note 12, at 146–60. 
 98 See id. 
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British laws by using other existing laws and legal concepts.  The laws 
already in place, such as FISA99 in the United States, with a few ad-
justments as to protocol100 would work just as well in catching poten-
tial terrorists of all varieties, including persons born and raised in the 
United States.  Similarly, in the United Kingdom, where stringent 
laws such as TACT were already in place prior to September 11, 2001, 
laws that did not target specific religious or racial groups could be 
used to catch terrorists without causing undue burdens to free 
speech, free exercise, and free association.101
II. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE U.K.’S 
ANTI-TERROR LAWS 
A. Hypothetical Situations In Which Muslims Could Run Afoul 
of the PATRIOT Act and the U.K.’s Anti-Terror Laws 
The laws of both the United States and the United Kingdom may 
not be as protective of free exercise and free speech as they once 
were,102 and many possibilities for people to violate the PATRIOT Act 
and the British Anti-Terror Laws exist, even under seemingly inno-
cent circumstances.103  For instance, it is possible for a Muslim, giving 
to charity, to violate the laws amended by the PATRIOT Act, subject-
ing him or her to the possible civil and criminal penalties of the 
Act.104  For example, Jane Doe, a Muslim residing in Jersey City, New 
Jersey regularly attends prayer services at a mosque in town.  Jane 
wants to give to charity, and decides to “adopt an orphan” in Pales-
tine.  After sponsoring a child for nearly a year through the charity, 
an article is published on the front page of the local newspaper, indi-
cating that the charity and other similar charitable funds in the area 
guarantee support to the children of suicide bombers in Palestine, 
 99 Lerner, supra note 32, at 500–01.   
 100 Id. 
 101 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.). 
 102 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 
18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.); Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24; Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11. 
 103 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act; Prevention of Terrorism Act; Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act; Terrorism Act. 
 104 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2000 & Supp. 2006) (proscribing collection of 
funds for the intended purpose of causing bodily injury to a non-combatant under 
penalty of fine and imprisonment of up to ten years); Id. § 981(a)(1)(G) (permitting 
civil forfeiture of all assets associated with terrorist enterprise).  For a detailed analy-
sis, see infra notes 102–56 and accompanying text. 
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specifically those working with Hamas.  In fact, after performing 
some research, Jane learns that she has been sending money to sup-
port the child of a suicide bomber who killed seven people on a street 
corner in Tel-Aviv just days after she agreed to sponsor the child.  
Immediately after finding out that the charity is funding terrorist op-
erations, Jane cancels her sponsorship of the Palestinian child.  The 
Department of Justice begins searching through the charity’s receipts 
for the last seven years and discovers that Jane Doe has been giving 
money to the charity for nearly a year.  They begin to investigate her 
for materially aiding a terrorist organization.  Penalties for Ms. Doe’s 
actions could be as severe as civil forfeiture of all of her assets.105
It is also possible for a person to violate the British Anti-Terror 
Laws by expressing political and religious beliefs.  For example, John 
Roe is a Muslim originally from Morocco who became a naturalized 
citizen of the United Kingdom about five years ago after fleeing po-
litical persecution in his nation of origin.  He has recently taken an 
interest in the state of the conflict between Palestine and Israel, and 
has decided to come down on the side of Palestine.  He believes that 
Israel should be eliminated as a state, but through diplomatic and 
peaceful means.  John Roe has never advocated for violence, and be-
lieves firmly that a diplomatic solution to the problem will be best for 
everyone in the long run.  A few weeks ago, on a Friday after his 
mosque’s prayer service, John spoke publicly about his belief that Is-
rael should be eliminated as a state.  His speech was reported to the 
U.K. government, and John is currently under investigation by law 
enforcement.  If found culpable, Mr. Roe will be subject to penalties 
ranging from control orders monitoring his movements,106 to being 
stripped of his naturalized citizen status and deported to his native 
country.107
B. The United States Constitutional and Statutory Assessment of the 
PATRIOT Act 
The United States Constitution guarantees certain protections to 
all people within the borders of the United States.108  Laws passed by 
 105 See, e.g., § 2339C; § 981(a)(1)(G). 
 106 PROTECT OUR RIGHTS, supra note 15. 
 107 Id.  By way of an act passed at the same time as the Terrorism Act 2006, the 
United Kingdom Secretary of State is empowered to deprive any person of citizen-
ship if he believes it is “conducive to the public good.” Immigration, Asylum and Na-
tionality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 56 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts2006/20060013.htm. 
 108 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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the Congress must comport with the provisions of the Constitution.109  
Generally, the laws must not unduly impinge upon fundamental 
rights and freedoms without a compelling government interest.110  
More specifically, they must be facially neutral as to race, religion, 
gender, ethnicity, and other characteristics, in accordance with the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.111
The rights to free speech and free association are guaranteed 
under the First Amendment, and are thus viewed as fundamental 
rights which may not be impinged upon by the government without a 
compelling interest.112  Prior to the enactment of the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),113 rights to free exercise of religion 
were reviewed based upon the compelling interest test only when 
they were considered to be a hybrid of the rights to free exercise and 
some other fundamental right, usually freedom of association or 
freedom of speech.114  Since the institution of RFRA, claims of in-
fringement upon free exercise rights must be reviewed using the 
compelling interest test.115  Additionally, in the sphere of First 
Amendment rights, the government impingement must generally be 
content-neutral, restricting all people equally or none at all.116
 109 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 110 See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (“The power to 
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the 
abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote . . . or, as here, the free-
dom of political association.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 111 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (holding that, as aliens were 
a discrete and insular minority, a law prohibiting any alien from holding a position in 
New York City government was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 112 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940): 
  [A] State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the 
times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of 
holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the 
peace, good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitu-
tionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 113 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 114 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
 115 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; see also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216–17 (2006). 
 116 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by 
conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.”).  The rele-
vance of free speech cases to restrictions on time, place, and manner in the free ex-
ercise context is illustrated in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village 
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160 n.8 (2002): 
 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment 
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously mo-
tivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the 
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The PATRIOT Act was passed in order “to deter and punish ter-
rorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law 
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”117  Pre-
sumably, the protection of human beings from terrorist acts is a com-
pelling government interest, as was similarly stated in Korematsu v. 
United States,118 where the Court held that “[p]ressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions . . . .”119  Title 
III of the PATRIOT Act regulates the flow of currency through na-
tional and international organizations, including charities.120  In par-
ticular, section 311 governs the treatment of organizations, including 
charities, which are found to have “laundered money” for the mate-
rial support of terrorism by the Secretary of the Treasury.121  The Sec-
retary of the Treasury, along with the Secretary of State and the At-
torney General of the United States, may work together after the 
Secretary of the Treasury has designated that a person or an organi-
zation has laundered money, to take steps to criminally and civilly 
punish these organizations.122
In addition, the Secretary of State and Attorney General of the 
United States have put together a list of charitable organizations that 
have ties to terrorist organizations, and thus may be guilty of funnel-
ing money to terrorists.123  Some have argued that, by placing these 
charities on a “banned” list, the federal government is restricting a 
form of religious conduct, and thus, free exercise of religion.124  Indi-
vidual persons and non-charitable organizations may also be subject 
to the ban, in accordance with section 411 of the PATRIOT Act, 
which “authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with or upon 
the request of the Attorney General, to designate terrorist organiza-
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protec-
tions, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . . .  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 117 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, preamble (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 
18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) 
 118 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 119 Id. at 216. 
 120 USA PATRIOT Act, tit. 3. 
 121 Id. § 311. 
 122 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not protect as free-
dom of religion the right to fund a terrorist organization). 
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tions for immigration purposes.”125  The list designates organizations 
which have come to the attention of the Attorney General as having 
done one of the following: 1) “commits or incites to commit, under 
circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bod-
ily injury, a terrorist activity;” 2) “prepares or plans a terrorist activ-
ity;” 3) “gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; 
or” 4) “provides material support to further terrorist activity.”126  The 
list contains organizations outside the Islamic world, including several 
Communist organizations and a few for the liberation of Northern 
Ireland.127
Largely, the litigation surrounding the PATRIOT Act as it per-
tains to Muslim-Americans has been in the arena of restrictions upon 
charities.128  As charity is one of the Five Pillars of the Islamic faith,129  
the act of almsgiving is extremely important to the free exercise of 
the Muslim religion.130  While courts have thus far held that the 
PATRIOT Act’s provisions are, in their general application, constitu-
tional,131 the provisions regarding charitable contributions have been 
challenged numerous times because of the importance of charity to 
Muslim-Americans.132  In almost every one of these cases, the provi-
sions of the PATRIOT Act which result in civil and criminal penalties 
for Muslims who give to organizations on the Terrorist Exclusion 
List133 have been challenged under the RFRA.134
The RFRA was passed in response to the decision of the Court in 
Employment Division v. Smith,135 which invalidated the compelling in-
terest test established under Sherbert v. Verner136 and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder137 for facially neutral laws, stating “[i]t is a permissible reading 
of the text [of the First Amendment] . . . to say that if prohibiting the 
exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the . . . [law] but merely 
 125 TERRORIST EXCLUSION LIST, supra note 37 (bulleted list in original). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 (D. Ill. 2004) 
(holding in part that the First Amendment protections of freedom of religion, ex-
pression, and association cannot shield criminal and civil liability for criminal ac-
tion); Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 160. 
 129 Arzt, supra note 75, at 19. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 165. 
 132 Id. 
 133 TERRORIST EXCLUSION LIST, supra note 37. 
 134 Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 160. 
 135 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 136 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 137 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid 
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”138  The 
Court held that prior cases where “the First Amendment bar[red] 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously moti-
vated action . . . involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the 
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protec-
tions, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”139  The RFRA, 
passed in 1993, overturned the Smith decision by statute.140
The RFRA states that only when the compelling interest test, es-
tablished under Sherbert141 and Yoder,142 is met can the government 
impede the free exercise of religion, even by facially neutral, gener-
ally applicable laws.143  This would include religious conduct as well as 
religious speech, as the aforementioned cases included both.144  Al-
though the RFRA was invalidated under City of Boerne v. Flores145 as to 
its Fourteenth Amendment implications for states,146 the statute was 
recently affirmed by Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal.147  As such, the RFRA applies to all federal laws, including the 
PATRIOT Act. 
In O Centro Espirita, the Court applied the compelling interest 
test established under Sherbert and Yoder to Schedule I of the Con-
 138 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.  In Smith, the issue was whether Smith’s use of peyote for 
sacramental purposes was a legitimate reason for the termination of his employment 
and subsequent denial of unemployment benefits under Oregon state law.  Id. at 
874–75.  Smith claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated under the 
Oregon statute, which prohibited the knowing or intentional possession of a con-
trolled substance, including peyote, by any individual, regardless of purpose.  Id.  
The Court indicated that a compelling interest test was not required where a facially 
neutral law had some incidental burden on free exercise of religion.  Id. at 885. 
 139 Id. at 881 (citations omitted). 
 140 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 141 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963). 
 142 406 U.S. 205, 219–22 (1972). 
 143 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 144 See id.  In Sherbert, the court upheld the plaintiff’s right to collect unemploy-
ment benefits after she was fired for refusing to come to work on Saturdays, citing 
her religious objection as a Seventh-Day Adventist.  See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.  In 
Yoder, the court upheld the right of Amish parents to keep their children home from 
school, despite a local regulation to the contrary, citing their religious belief that 
education after the eighth grade was unnecessary for members of their religion.  See 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. 
 145 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).  The main reason why the Court invalidated RFRA as 
to the states was federalism.  Id. (“Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in ef-
fect to mandate some lesser test . . .  the statute nevertheless would require searching 
judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation.  This is a 
considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives . . . .”). 
 146 Id. 
 147 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
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trolled Substances Act (“CSA”), which prohibited the importing, pos-
session, or use of a substance known as dimethyltryptamine 
(“DMT”).148  DMT, a chemical naturally occurring in certain plants 
native to the Amazon forest, was used in a sacramental tea by a 
church founded in the Amazon region.149  The Court held that, re-
gardless of its intentions, the government bore the burden of proving 
that its interests in prohibiting all uses of DMT, including religious 
ones, were compelling, and that the prohibitive measures in place 
were the least restrictive means of protecting its compelling inter-
ests.150  Further, the Court found the government’s argument against 
making a religious exception to the CSA unconvincing.151
The Government’s argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bu-
reaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll 
have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.  But RFRA op-
erates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest 
test, of exceptions to “rule[s] of general applicability.”  Congress 
determined that the legislated test “is a workable test for striking 
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests.”  This determination finds support in our 
cases . . . . 
     We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility of case-by-case con-
sideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules.  
 . . . We had “no cause to believe” that the compelling interest test 
“would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way” to spe-
cific claims for exemptions as they arose.  Nothing in our opinion 
suggested that courts were not up to the task.152
There are no provisions in the PATRIOT Act that prevent free 
speech or free association per se.153  However, the relaxation of laws 
regarding government surveillance and wiretapping of suspected ter-
rorists may have a chilling effect upon certain forms of free speech 
and free association, especially as they pertain to the exercise of the 
Islamic faith.154  The question that begs asking is whether the safe-
guards proposed under the PATRIOT Act are the least restrictive 
 148 Id. at 1216. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id. at 1223. 
 152 Id. at 1223–24 (internal citations omitted). 
 153 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 
42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 154 See Lerner, supra note 32, at 495–506; Civil Rights Concerns, supra note 12, at 
146–60.   
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means of promoting and protecting the compelling interest of the 
United States government in preventing terrorism.155  In many in-
stances, the clear response from Muslims in the United States has 
been “no.”156
C. An Assessment of the U.K.’s Anti-Terror Laws In Light of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 
By comparison with the United States, the United Kingdom has 
far more stringent anti-terrorism laws.157  Their legislation stems from 
decades of dealing with internal terrorism and terrorism in colonial 
states abroad.158  Its laws are also tempered, however, by the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms,159 also known as the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), to which Britain is a signatory.160  In addition, the U.K. 
passed the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the main 
rights of the ECHR into British law.161  The rights guaranteed by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 include those found under Articles 9, 10, 
and 11 of the ECHR: freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of peaceful assembly.162
The United Kingdom has no written constitution, but many of 
the provisions of the ECHR are strikingly similar to those in the 
United States Constitution, with one main exception, at Article 10, 
Section 2 of the ECHR, which states: 
[t]he exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, re-
strictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, terri-
 155 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (2006). 
 156 See Civil Rights Concerns, supra note 12, at 146–60. 
 157 These laws are sometimes described by those in the human rights community 
as “draconian.” See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED KINGDOM—JUSTICE 
PERVERTED UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 (2003), avail-
able at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR450292003. 
 158 See id. at Background. 
 159 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://www.hri.org/ 
docs/ECHR50.html . 
 160 Id.  The ECHR came into force in all signatory nations in September 1953.  
European Court of Human Rights, History of the Court, http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2007). 
 161 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
 162 Id. § 1; see ECHR, supra note 159, Arts. 9–11. 
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torial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the dis-
closure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.163
Article 10, Section 2 provides for the preservation of personal dignity 
over the right to free speech.  Unlike the United States,164 in the 
United Kingdom, speech advocating hatred of others is not toler-
ated.165
As to free exercise of religion, in addition to the restrictions al-
ready in place, the United Kingdom has also proscribed, by way of the 
PTA, TACT, ATCSA, and its previous laws, funding of terrorist or-
ganizations.166  It has changed its charity monitoring laws to make it 
tougher for charities to illegally fund terrorist operations.167  In addi-
tion, it has similar forfeiture laws to those in the U.S.168  The United 
Kingdom has also put in place provisions for freezing orders that can 
last for up to two years from the date the freezing order is given.169  
This could potentially tie up the assets of suspected terrorists for a 
long enough period of time so as to thwart whatever plans the terror-
ist organization may have had.170  Immigration policies have also been 
changed under the ATCSA to make it more difficult for terrorists to 
enter the country.171
The Terrorism Act 2006 and its corollaries go much further in 
regulating activity in the U.K.172  These laws greatly limit the rights to 
free speech, free association, and free exercise of religion guaranteed 
to all people in the United Kingdom by Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the 
ECHR.173  The mere visiting of certain designated websites and book 
 163 ECHR, supra note 159, Art. 10, cl. 2. 
 164 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 165 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, ¶ 1 (Eng.). 
 166 Terrorist Act, 2000, c. 11, Explanatory Note (Eng.): 
   The Act reforms and extends previous counter-terrorist legislation, and 
puts it largely on a permanent basis. The previous legislation con-
cerned is: the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1989 (c. 4) (‘the PTA’); the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act 1996 (c. 22) (‘the EPA’); and sections 1 to 4 of the Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 (c. 40). 
 167 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, Explanatory Notes ¶¶ 41–
42 (Eng.). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at Part 2.   
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.); Clarke Press Release, supra note 14. 
 173 See Terrorism Act, 2006.   
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stores, or association with designated organizations, may be grounds 
for criminal sanctions under the law.174
In addition, condoning or glorifying terrorist acts that have oc-
curred anywhere in the world is a criminal offense.175  Naturalized 
citizens may be stripped of their citizen status for acting in a manner 
“contrary to the interests of the country” and for participating in ex-
tremism.176  Extremism is defined by the government in a rather sim-
plistic way, stating, “[t]hey demand the elimination of Israel; the 
withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of 
the wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively 
Taleban states and Sharia law in the Arab world en route to one ca-
liphate of all Muslim nations.”177
Because of the broad wording of the Terrorism Act 2006, it is 
possible that people who have never participated in terrorist acts be-
lieve in the ideas expressed by the U.K. government as being “extrem-
ist.”178  The danger here is that people who have done nothing wrong, 
who merely hold an opinion, could be stripped of citizenship and 
removed from their country merely for having that opinion.179  This 
goes against the spirit of the ECHR, which was meant to promote and 
protect basic human rights for all people within the European juris-
dictions that were signatories to the Convention.180
Other provisions in violation of the ECHR are: relaxing of re-
strictions on holding time of suspects without charge, which was in-
creased from fourteen days to twenty-eight days (a potential violation 
of Article 5, Sub. 2 of the ECHR); designation of “special judges” for 
secret courts where public trials are not held (a potential violation of 
Article 6 of the ECHR); and further proscriptive powers given to the 
government to ban “extremist” groups from the country.181  As the 
new law has only recently been passed by Parliament, no cases exist to 
examine these principles.182
 174 PROTECT OUR RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 16. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 6. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See ECHR, supra note 159. 
 181 PROTECT OUR RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 8–10. 
 182 Several cases, however, have examined and quashed the Control Orders en-
tered pursuant to the PTA because the orders have been found to conflict with the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  See Judge Quashes Anti-terror Orders, BBC NEWS, June 28, 
2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5125668.stm. 
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D. Impact of the PATRIOT Act and the U.K.’s Anti-Terror Laws on 
Freedom of Expression and Free Exercise of Religion 
The impact of both the PATRIOT Act and the U.K.’s Anti-Terror 
legislation on freedom of expression and free exercise of religion 
may be chilling to genuine followers of the Islamic faith.  As stated 
supra, the penalties for violating the anti-terror legislation in either 
country can be quite severe.183  Recall the hypothetical situations of 
Jane Doe and John Roe, proposed in Section II.A, wherein both indi-
viduals merely acted in accordance with their genuinely and firmly-
held religious beliefs.184  Both were under investigation for potential 
violations of the anti-terror laws in their respective countries.185
It is unclear what would happen to Jane Doe under the 
PATRIOT Act.  Certainly, under the PATRIOT Act, the penalties for 
materially aiding a terrorist organization are rather severe.186  The 
penalties range from civil forfeiture of all assets belonging to the per-
son materially aiding a terrorist organization187 to criminal sanctions 
and prison time.188  As codified, the relevant statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 
981, 983, 985, 2331, and 2339B (2000 and Supp. 2006).  In this case, 
as Jane Doe did not knowingly aid a terrorist organization, she 
probably would not be subject to criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 
2339B, which requires the defendant to “knowingly [provide] material 
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization . . . .”189
However, the standard for proving that Jane’s assets are subject 
to civil forfeiture is far lower than the standard for proving criminal 
responsibility in this case.190  The relevant statute describes the gov-
ernment’s burden of proof in detail, stating that it shall be by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.191  The government bears the burden of 
proof in establishing that any property used bears a substantial con-
nection to the criminal activity alleged, if any.192  As civil forfeiture is 
based, at least in part, on the legal fiction that an inanimate object 
can do something unlawful while its owner/possessor is wholly inno-
 183 See supra notes 102–7 and accompanying text. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. 
 186 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2000 and Supp. 2006). 
 187 Id. § 981(a)(1)(G)(iii). 
 188 Id. § 2339B. 
 189 Id. § 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 190 Id. § 983(c). 
 191 Id. 
 192 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) (2000 and Supp. 2006).  
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cent of wrongdoing,193 all the property need do is be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. 
In this case, the property would likely be Jane’s bank account, as 
she allowed a direct deduction and wire transfer each month to the 
charity.194  Other property subject to civil forfeiture under this act 
might include Jane’s computer, if she had used it to set up the trans-
fer or contact the charity regarding the funds, and her home, if she 
had used her home telephone to set up the transfer of money or the 
charity’s representatives.195
Jane’s main defense under the law would come from 18 U.S.C. § 
983(d), the Innocent Owner Defense.196  Under Section 
983(d)(2)(A), Jane can claim that “upon learning of the conduct giv-
ing rise to the forfeiture, [she] did all that reasonably could be ex-
pected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the prop-
erty.”197  She terminated payments from her bank account to the 
charity immediately after she saw the newspaper article. 
However, if for some reason this defense fails Jane in court, then 
she has only one viable defense option left: she must plead an Exces-
sive Fines defense under the Eighth Amendment, which states that 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”198  In this case, a forfei-
ture of the entirety of Jane’s property would probably be viewed as 
excessive by the court.199  If the fine, or in this case the forfeiture, is 
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, then the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits its enforcement.200  Jane’s contributions to 
 193 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 11 (1999). 
 194 See United States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van, 50 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) (bank account used as a conduit to transfer money between terrorist organiza-
tions was subject to civil forfeiture). 
 195 United States v. 45 Claremont St., 395 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
substantial connection between property and offense existed where a home was used 
as the storage place for illegal narcotics, and that the home was therefore subject to 
forfeiture). 
 196 18 U.S.C. § 983(d). 
 197 Id. § 983 (d)(2)(A). 
 198 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 199 See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, When Does Forfeiture of Real Property Violate 
Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment—Post-Austin Cases, 168 A.L.R. Fed. 375 § 5 
(2005) (stating that factors to be considered in evaluating whether a forfeiture is ex-
cessive include: (1) harshness of the forfeiture, when compared to the gravity of the 
offense, and any sentence that may be imposed on a person committing such an of-
fense; (2) any relationship between the property to be forfeited and the offense al-
leged; and (3) the role played by the owner of the property in the alleged offense, as 
well as the owner’s potential degree of culpability). 
 200 Id. 
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charity over the past year probably amounted to no more than 
$500.00.  In such a case, forfeiture of a house, computer, and the en-
tirety of Jane’s bank account would probably be viewed as grossly dis-
proportionate. 
Jane could probably not make a viable defense for herself under 
the RFRA201 or the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.202  
The PATRIOT Act is a facially neutral law, general in its application 
to all individuals, regardless of religious affiliation.203  Therefore, the 
RFRA would apply, and the compelling interest test would be used by 
courts to review the PATRIOT Act.204  While few courts have exam-
ined this issue, a court faced with it would probably find that the gov-
ernment’s compelling interest in protecting its citizens from acts of 
terrorism supercedes the individual right to free exercise of relig-
ion.205  Additionally, unlike the Controlled Substances Act (the law of 
general applicability claimed to have burdened the religious free-
doms of members of the UDV in O Centro Espirita),206 which contained 
explicit allowances for the exemption of certain persons from com-
pliance therewith,207 the PATRIOT Act contains no such legislative 
enforcement waiver.208  It appears that the legislature felt the en-
forcement provisions of the PATRIOT Act were sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to the compelling state interest of preventing terrorism in 
the United States, and thus made no allowance for free exercise 
rights when giving to charities linked with terrorist activities.209  After 
all, Jane was not stopped by the law from giving to all Islamic chari-
 201 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 202 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Uniao do Vegetal, 
126 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (2006). 
 203 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 
22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 204 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3).    
 205 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Acting against the funding of terrorism does not violate the free 
exercise rights protected by RFRA and the First Amendment.”). 
 206 O Centro Espirita, 126 S. Ct. at 1217 (citing the Controlled Substances Act as the 
law of general application). 
 207 Id. at 1221. 
 208 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) § 
411, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 345–50 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 209 See id. § 411(a)(1)(F)(II), 115 Stat. 345–50. 
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ties; she was merely prevented from giving to a charity that was linked 
with terrorist activities.210
If Jane Doe lived in London before the passage of the Terrorism 
Act 2006 instead of Jersey City, her situation might not be much dif-
ferent.  The PTA, TACT, and ATCSA provide for charity monitoring 
procedures and for the forfeiture of assets that are considered “ter-
rorist cash” and “terrorist property.”211  Based upon a reading of the 
ATCSA Parts 1 and 2,212 Jane would probably not be subject to forfei-
ture of any of her property.  The provisions for forfeiture of “terrorist 
cash” state: 
(1) Schedule 1 which makes provision for enabling cash which- 
a.  is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism, 
b.  consists of resources of an organization which is a pro-
scribed organization, or 
c.  is, or represents, property obtained through terrorism, to 
be forfeited in civil proceedings before a magistrates’ court 
or (in Scotland) the sheriff) [sic] is to have effect.213
Any forfeiture would be subject to subsection (a) of Paragraph 1, 
and would result in a forty-eight hour hold prior to an actual order 
for forfeiture being issued.214  During that time, it is incumbent upon 
 210 This could be construed as the least restrictive means under the compelling 
interest test of preventing support of terrorism while respecting the right of indi-
viduals to give to religious charities. 
 211 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). 
 212 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, Pts. 1, 2. 
 213 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, Pt. 1, ¶ 1. 
 214 Id. at Sched. 1, Pt. 2.  The ATCSA states that one of three preconditions of 
continued detention of forfeited cash must be met: 
that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash is in-
tended to be used for the purposes of terrorism and that either- 
(a) its continued detention is justified while its intended use is further 
investigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United King-
dom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with 
which the cash is connected, or 
(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash 
is connected have been started and have not been concluded; 
 
that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash consists 
of resources of an organisation which is a proscribed organisation and 
that either-  
(a) its continued detention is justified while investigation is made into 
whether or not it consists of such resources or consideration is given to 
bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against 
any person for an offence with which the cash is connected, or 
(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash 
is connected have been started and have not been concluded; 
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both the victim (here, Jane) and the government to investigate the 
matter.215  Jane would have to make an application to have the money 
returned to her.216  In addition, the provisions for forfeiture of “ter-
rorist property” put forward similar criteria for making a finding that 
the property is, in fact, “terrorist property.”217
However, under the Terrorism Act 2006,218 Ms. Doe may not be 
so lucky.  Jane’s ability to protect her assets will turn largely on the 
rhetoric of the charity.  If the charity is an “extremist” organization, 
Jane may have problems refuting that she herself is an “extremist.”  
Only time will tell if she might be subject to forfeiture of all her assets 
merely because she gave to a charity with an “extremist” message. 
Under the laws in place in the United Kingdom prior to the pas-
sage of Terrorism Act 2006, John Roe might have some problems 
with law enforcement.  John Roe is not a terrorist and he has not 
publicly advocated terrorist ideology.  However, he may be investi-
gated as a suspected terrorist because, regardless of his intent, his 
ideas could incite others to violence.219  Under the PTA, the British 
government may issue a control order limiting a person’s movement 
in the U.K. and forcing them to submit to searches based upon the 
belief of the Home Secretary that the suspect is involved in terrorist 
activities.220  While he may not face any charges under the current leg-
islation for merely expressing his opinion, John Roe may have his life 
disrupted for as long as the Home Secretary sees fit in order to ascer-
tain John’s true motives.221
 
that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash is prop-
erty earmarked as terrorist property and that either-  
(a) its continued detention is justified while its derivation is further in-
vestigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United King-
dom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with 
which the cash is connected, or 
(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash 
is connected have been started and have not been concluded. 
Id.  
 215 Id. 
 216 Id.  
 217 Id. at Sched. 1, Pt. 3. 
 218 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.). 
 219 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.) (incorporating, among other things, 
Article 10 of the ECHR, entitled “Freedom of Expression,” which states that “[t]he 
exercise of [freedom of expression] . . . may be subject to such formalities, condi-
tions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democ-
ratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . ”). 
 220 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, ch. 2, §§ 1–4 (Eng). 
 221 Id. § 1.3.1.a. 
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Under the Terrorism Act 2006, John Roe could be in for far 
more trouble.  His comment could be construed as “extremist” under 
the definition proffered in the newly proposed legislation.222  As an 
extremist, John could be stripped of his citizenship.223  Though he 
was originally a political refugee who became a naturalized citizen, 
John could be deported for his actions.224  In this case, however, be-
cause John’s country of origin may seek his death if he returns, the 
U.K. government would be constrained by the ECHR not to deport 
John back to Morocco.225  The U.K. has been negotiating Memoranda 
of Understanding with countries such as Morocco to circumvent the 
problem created in this area by the ECHR.226
Just for expressing his firmly-held beliefs, John may be subjected 
to a punishment so harsh as to strip him of all rights in his nation-
state.  Certainly, this would work a chilling effect on the free expres-
sion of ideas, and may drive such ideas underground, where they are 
more likely to fester and produce violent results.227
If we assume the same facts, with the exception that John Roe is 
a naturalized U.S. citizen living in New York, the results are far better 
for Mr. Roe.  Under the laws currently established in the United 
States, John would be free to express his idea that Israel should be 
eliminated as a state, regardless of how others feel about it.228  Such 
an idea, presented in the manner in which John presented it, would 
be acceptable under the standard set in Brandenburg.229  In order for 
John’s speech to be punishable in the United States, John would have 
to incite violence in his intended audience.230
Both the United States and the United Kingdom face a crisis, 
and both walk a precarious line between protecting their citizens 
from terrorist attacks and protecting their citizens’ rights under their 
domestic laws.  In addition, both countries have put in place laws that 
limit individual freedom of expression, and in some cases, religion, in 
order to protect national security.  Both countries have also ap-
 222 PROTECT OUR RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 6–7. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See id. 
 227 Cf. Liberty, Press Release, supra note 11 (citing the over-broad nature of the 
Terrorism Bill 2006 in the area of inciting terrorist acts and glorifying terrorism). 
 228 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (standing for the 
proposition that mere advocacy of a position, without more, is protected speech un-
der the First Amendment). 
 229 Id. at 448. 
 230 Id. 
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proached the situation as though they are at war with another nation, 
as opposed to merely catching criminals who do heinous acts of mur-
der in the name of religion.  As such, people who are merely exercis-
ing their rights to expression and religion may be mistaken for “the 
enemy.” 
III.     CONCLUSION 
The laws of two great western nations, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, are in jeopardy of stripping from their people the 
very freedoms upon which the modern states were respectively 
founded.  In the United Kingdom, the loss of freedom threatened is 
far worse for those naturalized citizens with unpopular political and 
religious beliefs than it is for any other citizen.  In the United States, 
the loss of freedom, while not as great as that in the United Kingdom, 
is still significant.  It is the praxis that will most affect the Muslim 
population in both the United States and the United Kingdom.  The 
relaxation of civil rights protections initiated by the recent legislation 
in both nations greatly affects those with minority political and reli-
gious beliefs.  Unfortunately, once a precedent allowing discrimina-
tion toward one group with unpopular beliefs is set, all persons are in 
jeopardy of sliding down a slippery slope of steadily eroded civil 
rights.  Perhaps today, the unpopular religious belief is that people 
should physically struggle and fight in the cause of God, as opposed 
to conducting a personal struggle within oneself; perhaps tomorrow, 
it will be something we view now as far less controversial, and will af-
fect far more people. 
In conclusion, while the governments of both the United States 
and the United Kingdom certainly have a compelling interest in pro-
tecting their citizens from harm by terrorist attack, those govern-
ments must find a more narrowly-tailored way in which to regulate 
that possible harm.  Both governments had laws in place before the 
September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 attacks that allowed for surveil-
lance, civil forfeiture of illegally used or obtained assets, and criminal 
penalties for terrorist acts.231  Otherwise, these great nations run the 
risk of alienating the very people they claim to protect, through fear, 
through animus, and worst of all, through hate, all in the guise of 
protecting and serving the public.  As Benjamin Franklin once said, 
“[t]hose, who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little 
 231 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (Supp. 2006); Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 
U.S.C.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). 
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temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”232  We who love 
liberty must face the responsibility it confers upon each of us.  While 
the liberties we love are threatened by our government, none who 
claim citizenship there under may rightly claim safety as well. 
 
 232 FRANKLIN, supra note 1, at 107. 
